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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of share ownership, creditorship and net-
working by financial institutions on the performance of 94 Dutch non-financial
firms in the period 1992-1996. We find a nonlinear relationship between firm
performance and ownership by banks. Because of various defense mechanisms
the role of the shareholder is very limited in the Netherlands. Financial institu-
tions are, however, in a position to discipline firm management through other
channels. It turns out that there is a direct positive link between share ownership
by banks and the firms’ short-term bank loans, which indicates the existence of
a financing channel. Financial institutions are also represented on the supervi-
sory boards of firms and vice versa, which is an example of networking. This
suggests that besides creditorship networking may be an additional disciplinary
device for financial institutions. Here we find that there is a significant posi-
tive relationship between share ownership by insurance companies and pension
funds and the probability of networking.
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1 Introduction
The efficiency of different corporate governance systems has attracted the attention
of researchers as well as policy makers in recent years (see Shleifer and Vishny,
1997, and Zingales, 1997, for surveys). There is a special interest in the question
whether capital market based systems in the US and the UK or the blockholder/bank
based systems in continental Europe and Japan are better suited to monitor corporate
management. In the former system the owners of the firm control the firm whereas
in the latter system managers have a big say in the control of the firm. Starting from
agency theory empirical studies test the relationship between firm performance and
governance characteristics. By and large empirical evidence seems to support the
hypothesis that owner-controlled firms perform better than manager-controlled firms
(see Gugler, 1998, and OECD, 1998).
In this paper we study a special example of corporate governance: the Dutch case.
A lot of attention has been given to the German universal bank model (see Emmons
and Schmid, 1998, and Boehmer, 1998, for recent information), to which the Dutch
model is often compared. In Germany the role of banks is alleged to improve firm
performance, although the empirical evidence is mixed (see Edwards and Fischer,
1994, and Emmons and Schmid, 1998). Even if one looks at the early days of the
German universal banking model in 1903-1913 there is no clear positive effect of
bank relationships (see Fohlin, 1998). The Dutch system of corporate governance
can be seen as a mixture of both the capital market-based system and the bank based
system. The similarity between the Dutch and German system can be found in the
two-tier co-operative system of management and in the role of financial institutions,
notably banks, in supplying debt, owning firm equity and being represented on super-
visory board of firms. In both countries shareholders are relatively ill protected (see
La Porta, et al., 1998). There are some major differences though between the two
countries. Firstly, share ownership is more dispersed in the Netherlands and market
capitalisation is higher. Secondly, Dutch banks are more concentrated themselves
than in the German case and are not involved in proxy voting. Thirdly, other financial
institutions like insurance companies are typically larger than their German counter-
parts and more actively engaged in investing in firms.
This paper proceeds as follows. The main goal of the paper is to test for the
effectiveness of the various mechanisms of corporate control. Our main test of the
effectiveness will be by regressing firm performance on governance characteristics
(see also Becht, 1998). Section 2.1 gives the basic insights in the theory of corporate
governance that apply to our case. In Section 2.2 we discuss the Dutch financial
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system in some detail and focus on ownership structure and the role of financial
institutions. Section 3 introduces the network and ownership variables that are central
to our analysis. In Section 4 the main results are presented. Section 5 summarises and
concludes.
2 Governance theory and Dutch institutions
2.1 Ownership and control
Berle and Means (1932) famously argued that ownership of firms is typically dis-
persed among many small shareholders, while control rights are concentrated in the
hands of managers. Such a state of affairs implies a principal-agent problem, as sug-
gested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1980). Managers
of the firm might not act in the interest of the owners. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
argue that a solution to this problem is to give investors control rights. The first
way to achieve this is to provide legal protection from expropriation by managers
(protection of minority rights, prohibition against insider dealing, etc.). If ownership
is dispersed (like in the US and the UK) legal protection is likely to be arranged. This
line of thought suggests that the alleged dispersion of ownership is not a hindrance for
effective corporate governance as long as legal protection is guaranteed. Empirical
evidence though illustrates the opposite. La Porta et al. (1999) report extensively
on corporate ownership around the world. It appears that in reality concentration
of ownership is a world-wide phenomenon (with the notable exceptions of the US
and the UK), even if one looks at the largest firms. This points to a second way
of dealing with the principal-agent problem: through concentrated ownership. This
might be arranged through 1) large minority or blockownership, 2) take-overs and 3)
large creditors. In the case of concentrated ownership a second conflict might arise:
between the large shareholder and the other shareholders.
Ownership reflects cash flow and/or voting rights. Under a one share/one vote
regime both rights coincide. There exists a wide range of institutions that troubles
this picture though. Pyramidal structures (like in Belgium, see Renneboog, 1998) spe-
cial voting rights, voting right restrictions (like in the Netherlands, see Section 2.2),
delegated voting (like in Germany), etc. can lead to these problems. Becht (1998)
reviews the dispersion-concentration trade-offs for investors. Dispersed ownership
with a concentration of voting power which, as we will argue below, is likely to be
the most relevant case in the Netherlands, has some advantages, like direct monitor-
ing, liquidity of shares, diversification of risks and a relatively low cost of capital.
But there are some disadvantages too: the misalignment of cash flow and control
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incentives, possible collusion between managers and blockholders and extraction of
private benefits.
The really important question is how ownership and control affect firm perfor-
mance.1 Of the three above mentioned channels we only briefly mention the case
of take-overs. Outside the US and UK there are simply very few if any hostile take-
overs. If take-overs do occur in Germany or the Netherlands Franks and Mayer (1996)
show that they are associated with changes in strategy and not with poor performance
of management. The second channel is large minority - or blockownership. Here the
OECD (1998) finds in his survey that owner controlled firms outperform manager
controlled firms. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argue that this result depends on the
degree of asset specificity of the industry. In industries where outside monitoring
is difficult large shareholders are ineffective in overcoming agency problems. For
reasons that will become clear in Section 2.2, in this paper we study block ownership
in combination with the third channel, creditorship, and in doing so focus on the
role of financial institutions. Financial institutions are especially important in a non-
market based system of corporate governance.
2.2 Corporate governance in the Netherlands
On January 1st 1997 more than 642 thousand firms were active in the Netherlands.
About 2 thousand firms are public limited companies and 134 thousand private lim-
ited companies.2 The firms listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange (165 firms in
1996) employ about 1.5 million people, which is approximately 25 per cent of the
total labour force. Of the listed firms we include 94 firms in our sample. In order to
shed some light on the most relevant characteristics of the Dutch financial system in
terms of governance, it is useful two distinguish two related issues: the ownership
structure and the role of financial institutions in the Netherlands.
2.2.1 Ownership structure We thus only include companies listed on the Ams-
terdam Exchanges Effectenbeurs N.V., the sole officially approved stock market in
1Most studies use performance measures based on financial statement data as backward looking
data to avoid the forward looking nature of stock prices. Market-based data, although better suited to
capture changes in value cannot be used in a cross sectional approach, because any effect of a change
in ownership structure would be included in the stock price once the market becomes aware of it (see
Boehmer, 1998).
2A public company can issue both bearer and registered shares, while a private limited company can
only issue registered shares. A private limited company must limit the free transferability of shares. A
public company can issue or buy back shares up to 10 percent without ongoing approval of shareholders.
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the Netherlands.3 Market capitalisation of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange is high
(117.8 per cent of nominal GDP in 1996). The international firms accounted for
about one-third of the market value in 1996. Dutch stock market institutions are
somewhat different from the Anglo-American system. Dutch accounting rules are
not as strict as the US GAAP generally accepted accounting principles and allow
various accounting principles across companies.
The EU Transparency Directive 88/627 sets up disclosure requirements for com-
panies listed on a European Union stock exchange. Under Dutch law these require-
ments are given in the Wet Melding Zeggenschapsrecht (WMZ). The first version of
this law came into operation on January 1st 1992. A new version was implemented
on June 1st 1997. The law requires all shareholders to notify any purchase or sale of
share stakes which cross the boundaries of 5, 10, 25, 50 or 66 2/3 per cent of issued
capital. This obligation applies to both ownership and voting rights separately. We
use these so called WMZ-data in our analysis.
In the Netherlands equity ownership is more concentrated than in the US and the
UK but more dispersed than in Germany. De Jong et al. (1998) find for the 137 listed
firms in 1995 that the average largest stake is about 28 per cent and the second largest
stake 9 per cent (see Kabir et al., 1997, for similar findings). Shares are largely held
by foreigners (approximately 50 per cent), financial institutions in general do not
have large amount of shares (insurance companies and pension funds are somewhat
of an exception, as we show later on). Only a few firms are under majority share
control (see Cantrijn et al., 1993). This implies that in the Dutch case monitoring
of management activities by large shareholders is rare, which might lead to free-
rider problems. Furthermore, even if ownership would be (more) concentrated, the
existence of several institutional features implies that management is not seriously
disciplined by the stock market irrespective of the degree of ownership concentration.
Although the stock market demonstrates high liquidity, defence against hostile take-
overs is well organised (see hereafter).
Apart from the relative dispersion of share ownership, the limited voting rights of
the shareholders is a second relevant feature of ownership in the Dutch case. In the
(Anglo-American) market for corporate control shareholders decide on management
issues on the annual meeting of shareholders. In the Netherlands the shareholder
meeting is from a managerial point-of-view not very relevant, since important deci-
3The listing requirements for a company are: (1) a history of at least five years (in at least three years
a profit must have been reported), (2) at least 10 million guilders equity capital (of which at least 10
per cent must be tradable with a market value of again at least 10 million guilders), (3) the firm needs
to be a public company (N.V.) or co-operative (like one of the three big Dutch banks in our sample
RABObank).
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sions cannot be made by shareholders. The Dutch Commission on Corporate Gover-
nance (Commissie Coroprate Governance, 1998) reviews the instruments to limit the
influence of the individual shareholder.
1. The issuing of certificates of deposits through an administrative office (rep-
resented by CERT ). This implies that the voting power remains within the
administrative office, since holders of certificates transfer their voting rights.
In our sample 36 of the 94 firms use certificates of deposits, as can be seen
from the first line of Table 1.
2. Block ownership of the major stakeholder (C1) over 40 per cent (C1 > 40%).
Of the 94 firms in our sample 21 firms have a large blockowner (see the second
line in Table 1).
3. The issuing of priority shares through administrative offices (or sometimes
called foundations) (PRIOR). 22 of our 94 firms issued priority shares (see
the third line of Table 1).
4. Taking up the structural regime. This implies a shift of voting power from the
shareholder meeting to the Board of Directors and Supervisory Board. The
Dutch system of a control by a Supervisory Board can be characterised by
three models (see Gelauff and Den Broeder, 1996), of which the the structural
regime is the most important one. In our sample 77 out of 94 firms fall within
this regime (see Commissie Corporate Governance, 1998).4 Of the 77 firms
that are under the structural regime 23 do this voluntarily (represented by Sv)
and 54 by law (Sl). These two classes are in the fourth and fifth line of Table 1.
5. The issuing of finance prefs (PREFf ). This is a rather weak instrument and
not considered to be a real powerful instrument to limit voting rights (see Com-
missie Corporate Governance, 1998). 15 firms in our sample issued finance
prefs. See the sixth line in Table 1.
6. The issuing of preference shares held by a continuity foundation (PREFd ) as
an anti-takeover instrument. 61 of our 94 firms use this instrument. See the last
line in Table 1.
In Table 1 we categorize the governance mechanisms.
4Some of the remaining 17 firms are under foreign control and fall under the so-called mitigated
structural regime. The foreign controlling company’s general meeting of shareholders approves the
annual statement of accounts and composes the management board.
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Table 1 Firm classification following instruments to limit voting power
Mechanism Cert > 50% 0 < CERT < 50% CERT D 0 Sl D 1 Sv D 1 C1 > 40%
CERT 30 6 58 15 8 6
C1 > 40% 2 4 15 8 4 21
PRIOR 3 1 18 13 6 5
Sl 17 3 34 54 0 12
Sv 7 1 15 0 23 4
PREFf 4 0 11 7 5 1
PREFd 22 5 34 38 15 7
Number of firms.
 CERT : the percentage of shares issued through certificates;
 C1: the largest stake of shareholding;
 PRIOR: a dummy variable representing priority share issuing;
 Sl : a dummy variable representing obligatory implementation of the structural regime;
 Sv : a dummy variable representing voluntary implementation of the structural regime;
 PREFf : a dummy variable representing finance prefs issuing;
 PREFd : a dummy variable representing anti-takeover prefs issuing.
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In Table 1 the lines represent the instruments and columns denote subclasses. The
first three columns subdivide according to the percentage of certification. The fourth
and fifth column give cross-tabulations for the structural regime dummy-variables,
while the last column does so for large stakeholdings (C1 > 40%). Table 1 reveals
the following. 51 firms have so-called permanent mechanisms to limit voting power:
either certification or block ownership (Table 1 reveals that 15 firms without certifi-
cation do have a large blockowner). There is hardly any block ownership if there is
majority certification. The firms that did not issue certificates are under the structural
regime to a large extent (49 of the remaining 58 firms, as can be seen from lines
4 and 5 and column 3). Firms with large blockownership use less defensive prefer-
ence shares. There are only three firms in our sample that have no mechanisms to
limit the voting power of external shareholders at all. The largest substitutes are the
blockholder concentration and certification (correlation of -0.27), blockholdership
and defence preference shares (-0.41) and certification and issuing priority shares
(-0.24).
Besides external control by shareholders, there is the issue of internal control
(see Morck et al., 1988). This control argument consists of two parts. First, the
organisation of control within the firm and secondly, share ownership by insiders.
With respect to the first part it is important to point out that Dutch firms, like German
firms, operate under a two-tier corporate control mechanism. The management board
controls day-to-day operations. The chairman is the most prominent Chief Executive
Officer (CEO). In case of the structural regime the presence of a supervisory board
is obligatory for limited liability companies with a subscribed capital of 25 million
guilders, at least 100 employees in the Netherlands and the presence of a workers
council (companies that are a subsidiary of a structural holding are exempted). Under
the structural regime the members of supervisory board are appointed by co-optation,
i.e. members of the incumbent supervisory board elect new members. In practice the
management board in practice substantially influences the composition of the super-
visory board (Van der Goot and Van het Kaar, 1997). This is a crucial difference with
the German case where the shareholders elect the member of the supervisory board.
The supervisory board ratifies important managerial decisions and it also determines
the annual statement of accounts (it also requires approval by the shareholders meet-
ing). Finally, the supervisory board members may appoint and dismiss members of
the management board, although this rarely happens (which is probably not a big
surprise given the influence of management on the composition of the board).
Inside share ownership is the second part of inside control. In contrast with the US
and in accordance with Germany, inside (managerial) ownership is of less importance
8
in the Dutch case. De Jong et al. (1998) give an overview of inside ownership by
members of the board of directors, members of the supervisory board and their family
for 25 of the 137 listed firms in 1995 (15 of these 25 firms are in our sample). 6 of
these companies are under majority inside ownership. In 5 of these cases the control
is fully within the board of directors and one in the supervisory board.
2.2.2 The Role of Financial Institutions Dutch financial institutions (here banks
and insurance companies) face no geographical restrictions and engage in industrial
investment, the supply of loans as well as in securities activities and the provision
of insurance to private agents. Customer relationships between financial institutions
(the (house)banks) and firms are usually well-developed and especially banks, mainly
through their role as suppliers of bank debt, often take the lead in the financial
restructuring of firms. The concentration ratio on the market for banking activities
is very high. The five largest banks have a market share of 84 per cent (see Bikker
and Groeneveld, 1998). Insurance companies engage in the same activities as banks
but their role as creditors is less important. De Bondt (1998) estimates that banks
supply up to 80 percent of all firm credit whereas other financial institutions like
insurance companies supply the remaining 20 percent. Pension funds represent the
third important type of financial institution in our analysis in Section 4. They are most
like a US type of institutional investors which means that they predominantly engage
in share ownership. In the Netherlands pension funds are, however, also involved in
the provision of (long term) debt to firms.
German banks serve three roles: they do not only supply debt, but also own equity
and are members of the supervisory board. While it is true that Dutch banks also
perform these three tasks, there are notable differences with the German case with
respect to ownership and supervision. Until 1992 banks were not allowed to have
more than 5 per cent of the outstanding shares of a firm and even now banks are
relatively unimportant as shareholders. De Jong et al. (1998) report that for the 137
listed firms in 1996 banks held 7.2 per cent of the shares, insurance companies about
2.4 per cent, pension funds 0.6 per cent, other financial institutions 15.5 per cent,
the government 1.3 per cent, industrial firms 10.6 per cent and individuals 10.8 per
cent (these numbers are based on the WMZ-data which means that only stakes of
5 percent or more are included). Apart from their role as shareholder and creditor,
both of which are mechanisms of outside control, financial institutions, banks and
other financial institutions are also linked with firms through their representation on
supervisory boards (and firms on the supervisory boards of financial institutions).
This linkage or networking channel does to some extent function as a means of
(informal) inside control. So the notion of networking between banks and firms on
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the level of management/supervisory board could be important in the Netherlands
from a corporate governance perspective since it provides banks and other financial
institutions with the opportunity to gather information about a firm and to exercise
some (informal) control. This might be relevant given the absence of the ownership
mechanism of control due to the small holdings of stocks as well as the existing
defence mechanisms.5
In the case of the Netherlands appointments on the supervisory board can be
seen from two points of view of information economics. First, the firm may want to
appoint ”high quality/high profile” supervisors to signal quality of management. To
that purpose they appoint captains of industry, well-known advisors or managers from
other companies of financial institutions. The main motive is a strategic advertising
one and not so much focused on direct quality of control. Secondly, a firm does not
want a supervisory board that controls the operations of the firm. A high quality firm
does not mind if the supervisory board interacts with the management if high quality
implies acting in the interest of the shareholders/supervisors anyway. Low quality
managers, however, may want to appoint friends in order to prevent low quality of
their management being revealed (and eventually corrected). In this case low quality
management appoints low quality control. Knowing this, the system of co-optation
may increase risk-averse behaviour of companies. Note that in the Dutch system the
quality of the supervision may thus simply reflect the quality of management. This
is all right as long as firms perform well but it can cause real problems if changes in
firms policies are called for (see also CPB, 1997, we return to this issue in Section
4 in our discussion of the causation between firms’ performance and the quality of
supervision). As shareholders have little influence on management given the array of
defence mechanisms at the disposal of firms (OECD, 1996, p. 88), the Dutch model
puts weight on creditors (notably banks since bank debt is the most popular source
of external finance), who promote risk-averse strategies and on informal linkages
or networking through the cross-representation on supervisory boards of financial
institutions and firms.
2.3 Hypotheses on Dutch corporate governance
We start from the agency cost perspective to formulate our hypotheses (see Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). From the previous sections it is clear that in the Netherlands banks
and other financial institutions may play an important role in Dutch corporate gov-
ernance. Financial institutions (see De Bondt, 1998), might be important mainly be-
5The big difference between the German and the Dutch financial institutions, is that German banks
benefit from the system of proxy voting, while this is not the case in the Netherlands.
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cause of their roles as suppliers of debt and member of informal networks with respect
to the composition of supervisory boards. Share ownership is not concentrated, but
both banks and other financial institutions (in our sample: insurance companies and
pension funds) have increased their share ownership in the recent years. Since there
is hardly any possibility for hostile take-overs, due to defence mechanisms, direct in-
fluence of shareholders is limited. Voting is often concentrated in a trust office that is
closely linked with the firm. Nevertheless, financial institutions (holding about 10 per
cent on average of total equity of the listed firms) are obviously concerned about firm
policy. A first question is whether and how firm performance and share ownership by
financial institutions are related. If there is any relationship at all, the next question
is how financial institutions might be able to exert control on managers. With respect
to this second question two issues are investigated: the relationship between share
ownership by financial institutions and the financial structure of firms and also the
relationship between this ownership and networking.
2.3.1 Share ownership by financial institutions and firm performance If share
ownership by financial institutions is 5 per cent or more (like in our sample), part of
the agency costs of control will be reduced, since the bank may monitor firm activity.
But a new conflict arises: between the financial institution, as a block shareholder,
and other minority/small shareholders. The question is whether or not financial in-
stitutions use their influence in a way that also benefits other shareholders, or more
general firm performance. Here we follow Gorton and Schmid (1996) and define
three hypotheses:
1. The coincidence-of-interests hypothesis: The more equity the financial insti-
tution holds, the more it uses its information and power to monitor the firm’s
management, thereby improving firm performance. The creation of an internal
capital market reduces information asymmetries, which stimulates firm per-
formance. Moreover financial institutions can create buffers to shield firms for
shocks. If this hypothesis holds firm performance increases monotonically with
share ownership by financial institutions;
2. The opposed-interests hypothesis: Financial institutions, notably banks, behave
as monopolists, using their power (as the sole supplier of external finance)
to extract profits from the firm at the expense of firm performance. Although
in some cases this might even be in the interest of the firm, for instance the
firm’s tax shield might increase, in general firm performance will decrease
monotonically with share ownership by financial institutions;
11
3. The insider hypothesis (a combination of the first two hypotheses): The finan-
cial institution faces a trade-off between its private benefits (monopoly profits
or private returns to bank managers) and the value of its shares. If financial
institutions play the role of insiders the managerial ownership theory becomes
relevant (see below).
Cable (1985) tested part of these hypotheses for Germany. He did find support for a
positive impact of shareholder concentration and bank voting power on firm perfor-
mance.6 Gorton and Schmid (1996) extend the Cable database and also find for their
1974-sample a positive relationship between bank ownership and performance, but
for their 1985-sample of firms there is no relationship at all. For Germany Emmons
and Schmid (1998) find support for a U-shaped relationship between firm perfor-
mance and share ownership by banks, thereby confirming the third hypothesis. In
our analysis we will be mainly interested with the question whether share ownership
by financial institutions has any impact at all on firm performance. It should be em-
phasized that is not our aim to validate or reject any of the three above mentioned
hypotheses. If it does turn out that share ownership matters, we then would like to
know whether and how financial institutions are able to engage in corporate gover-
nance in the Dutch case. Given that outside control by shareholders is not feasible, we
investigate two alternative control mechanisms: large creditorship and networking.
2.3.2 Large creditorship If banks and other financial institutions supply credit
to a firm, financial institutions can exercise control through this financing channel.
Firms typically do not want to reveal all information to the market and stick with
private loan contracts. The bank can monitor the firm activities, demand audits and
even impose penalty payments. In this way large creditors can be able to engage
in corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the Dutch case this can be
a relevant control mechanism since control by shareholders is ill-developed for the
reasons discussed in Section 2.2.
2.3.3 Networking If financial institutions are blockowners there might be an in-
centive to act as an insider. Being an insider the financial institution can monitor
the firm better and act in the interest of small shareholders. But it can also try to
distract funds from the firm once it is an insider. Edwards and Fischer (1994) test
the hypothesis that banks use their proxy votes to install their own representatives
6Cable’s paper is seriously criticised by Emmons and Schmid. Cable uses control data of 1975
to test firm performance over 1968-1972 and reverts causality. Moreover the statistical definition of
performance is sloppy.
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on supervisory boards and reject it. Gorton and Schmid (1996) find the opposite:
ownership does translate into supervisory board representation.
If financial institutions can be looked upon as insiders in the Dutch financial
system, the literature on inside or managerial ownership becomes relevant. If insiders
are blockholders themselves entrenchment is a possibility. The insiders (managers or
in our case financial institutions) control a substantial fraction of the firm’s equity and
have enough power to primarily look after their own interests (as opposed to those of
outsiders). Stulz (1988) presents a theoretical model of the role of inside ownership.
Inside ownership increases the premium that a hostile bidder must pay to gain control,
but the probability that a take-over will succeed decreases. Managerial ownership
reduces the agency costs through lower costs of monitoring. But large managerial
ownership lacks diversification, might lead to excessive risk taking and tempts man-
agers to act in their own interest. Morck et al. (1988) find empirical support for this
model. They argue that managers will allocate resources in their own interest, but
if inside ownership increases their interest will coincide with outside owners. In the
0-5 per cent range they find a positive influence, but the sign turns negative in the
5-25 percent interval. If managerial ownership is over 25 percent there is positive
influence again. Demsetz (1983) argues that there is no relation between ownership
structure and profitability, since the firm’s organisation is an endogenous outcome of
competitive selection.
To summarise, we formulate three classes of hypotheses.
1. The first class involves the relationship between share ownership by financial
institutions and firm performance. We test for the impact of share ownership
by financial institutions on nonfinancial firm performance. In line with Gorton
and Schmid (1996) we test the coinciding, conflicting and insider hypothesis.
2. The second class of hypotheses concerns financial policy. Here we focus on
financial structure and the influence of financial institutions through share own-
ership on the financial structure. We expect that bank ownership might be re-
lated with the financing channel, while ownership by other financial institutions
will typically be related with long-term financing.
3. The third set of hypotheses deals with the determination of networking. We
expect that banks perform control through the supply of credit, while the other
financial institutions do use networking as a control mechanism.
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3 Data description
We use data from various sources. For the balance sheet and Income and loss-statement
variables we use the AMADEUS-dataset7 and the Handboek Beursgenoteerde On-
dernemingen, published by Het Financieele Dagblad for the years 1992 up to and
including 1996. The latter source is used for market values, dividends and short-
term bank loans, since these are not included in AMADEUS. AMADEUS includes
data on 165 listed firms. We focus on manufacturing firms and skip firms involved
in services. Moreover, since we are constructing a cross-section we want a balanced
set. The latter implies that firms in mergers and take-overs are excluded. Finally we
include firms that register their activity within the Netherlands only, which excludes
Royal Dutch Shell, the largest company in terms of total assets. In the final sample
we have 94 industrial firms.
Below we give a statistical description of our sample. For the sample firms we
compute from the balance sheet and income/loss statement:
 FIXED = material assets minus depreciation as a percentage of total assets.
Note that we do not include intangible assets.
 IKGROSS = gross investment over the 1991 capital stock.
 LEV ERAGE = the difference between total assets and equity as a fraction of
total assets.
 LT DEBT = total assets minus equity minus other short-term debt as a per-
centage of total assets.
 BDT OT = Short-term bank loans as a percentage from total assets. Note that
we only include short-term bank loans here, since no information on long-term
bank loans is available. Moreover, we have no indication of the fraction of
secured loans.
 FE = financial expense as a percentage of total assets.
 T A = total assets minus depreciation.
 CF = cash-flow plus depreciation.
 cv.CF/ = coefficient of variation of CFA (cv.x/ D stdev.x/=abs.mean.x//).
7AMADEUS is a dataset covering over 200000 firms in Europe. REACH is the Dutch variant of
AMADEUS.
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 DIV CF = dividend over cashflow.
 INT CF = interest payments over cashflow.
 ROA = return on assets: before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percent-
age of total assets.
 cv.SAL/ = coefficient of variation of sales (cv.x/ D stdev.x/=abs.mean.x//).
For the control/network variables we use the following sources and definitions:
1. Wet Melding Zeggenschapsrecht (WMZ). From 1992 onwards this law requires
shareholders to publicly report their shareholdings if their stake holdings in a
listed firm crosses the bands of 5, 10, 25, 50 and 66 2/3 per cent. The Dutch
financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad publishes this report annually.
This information gives share holdings over 5 per cent and it also limits our
sample-period. Also voting shares are published if they are over 5 per cent.
We compute share holdings by banks (BANK), insurance companies (INS),
pension funds (PENF ) and the sums FI D BANK C INS C PENF and
PINS D PENF C INS.
There are a few words of caution in using the WMZ-dataset. First there is a
statistical problem regarding the total capital outstanding. It might be that an
owner of shares is ill-informed on the denominator of its share percentage due
to option plans, take-overs and stock dividends. Secondly, it might also be the
case that large shareholdings for companies started after 1992 are not listed.
Thirdly, it could be that banks (briefly) hold involuntary amounts of shares
after they led an new share issue and kept these shares on the shelf. Still, despite
these disadvantages the WMZ-data are very useful and they are the only data
source available with respect to share ownership of individual Dutch firms.
2. From the report published by the Commission on Corporate Governance we
retrieved the following information:
 Sl: a dummy variable representing obligatory implementation of the struc-
tural regime;
 Sv: a dummy variable representing voluntary implementation of the struc-
tural regime;
 C1: the largest stake of shareholding;
 CERT : the percentage of shares issued through certificates;
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 PRIOR: a dummy variable representing priority share issuing;
 PREFf : a dummy variable representing finance prefs issuing;
 PREFd : a dummy variable representing anti-takeover prefs issuing.
3. From AMADEUS (or REACH) an indicator on diversification of firm activity
is calculated (DI ). We define this indicator as the percentage of 2-digit in-
dustry activities in which the company is involved outside its core business.
It is known that diversification can have a negative impact on both inside and
outside equity ownership (see Denis et al., 1997).
4. As a source for the network variables we used the Jaarboek van Nederlandse
Ondernemingen to compute the following variables with respect to the compo-
sition of the management and supervisory boards.8
 NET AB = 1 if a member of the management board of a financial in-
stitution/firm is a member of the supervisory board of the firm/financial
institution, and 0 if not (13 cases out of 94).
 NET C = 1, if a member of a supervisory board of a financial institution
is also a member of a supervisory board of the firm, and 0 if not (14 cases
out of 94).
 NET = 1 if there exists any informal link between a firm and financial
institution, either through the board of directors or the advisory board.
 RV B: the number of members of the board of directors.
 RV C: the number of members of the supervisory board.
In order to give an impression of the ownership and control data we give the
sample means (), median value (med) and standard deviation  in Table 2. These
average values indicate no abnormal values for corporate activity. It is important to
note that the values are averages of ratios and no ratios of averages (except for the
dividend-to-cashflow and interest-to-cash flow). The values in Table 2 for the vari-
ables which represent share ownership by financial institutions (BANK;PENF; INS
and FI ) are in line with Kabir et al. (1997) and Van Oijen (1998). Share ownership
by banks is on average the highest. A main reason for this is the important merger
wave in the beginning of the 1990s between private banks and insurance companies.
These financial conglomerates are labeled as banks in our sample. Pension funds have
8Note that we used annual reports of the RABObank, on the Big three Dutch banks, for the years
1992-1996 as additional information since the RABObank is a co-operative and not a listed company
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relatively low shareholdings in our data, which is due to the 5 percent threshold in
the WMZ-data.
4 Empirical Specification and Results
Our results refer to cross-section (1992-1996) estimations of models that include as
independent variable besides share ownership also variables that condition for normal
performance, financial or networking variables. We test our hypotheses, starting with
the relationship between share ownership and firm performance. Again it should be
emphasized that we are only interested in the question whether share ownership by
financial institutions matters at all for firm performance and not in the specific shape
of this relationship. We first tested for a linear relationship. The results given in Table
3 show for all our three models (to be listed hereafter) that there is no significant
impact of share ownership in a linear model (see the separate lines in Table 3), which
implies a rejection of both the coincidence and opposed hypothesis mentioned in
Section 2.3. Next we use a simple nonlinear (quadratic) structure to estimate the
insider hypothesis:
ROAi D 0 C 1SHi C 2SH 2i C 6jiCji C 6γjidji C 6ij vij C i (1)
where ROA denotes profitability (measured as return on assets), SH denotes either
BANK-share, PINS-share or FI -share, Cj is a conditioning variable, dj a dummy
denoting the membership of an industry class, vij a variable indicating the limitation
of voting power or other discplining instrument active (Sl; Sv; C1; CERT;PRIOR;PREFf
or PREFd ) and  a white-noise error term. As conditioning variables we use size
(ln.T A/), leverage LEV ER, diversity (DI ) and the ratio of cash-flow to total assets
(CF=T A). We include the suggested other means of governance as regressors too.
Implicitly we assume that SH is an exogenous variable. Financial institutions often
own shares for other reasons than the standard portfolio considerations. The involve-
ment of these institutions in the underwriting of share issues, financial restructuring
or legal guidelines as to their investment strategies as with pension funds, implies
that for financial institutions the portfolio argument is less important than for other
investors (see Gorton and Schmid, 1996, p. 13 for Germany and de Jong et al., 1998
for the Netherlands for a similar conclusion).
First we conclude that we can reject the linear ownership relation for financial
institutions. For banks we find support for a nonlinear relationship. We find an opti-
mum bank share holding of about 14 per cent, which is far above the average in our
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable  med 
FIXED 31.64 31.10 15.80
IKGROSS 27.73 23.68 19.20
LEVERAGE 69.54 62.10 12.29
LT DEBT 11.74 10.50 9.57
BANKDEBT 19.19 5.98 112.20
FE 3.14 2.88 2.20
T A (106 gld) 2278.82 402.44 7081.24
CF (106 gld) 404.75 78.35 1207.94
CF=T A 17.16 16.41 6.41
cv.CF/ 0.29 0.22 0.28
DIV CF 17.55 13.05 18.92
INT CF 14.02 12.41 12.71
ROA 9.74 9.21 4.75
cv.SALES/ 0.18 0.13 0.13
BANK 5.34 3.05 7.55
PENF 0.49 0 1.62
INS 3.90 0.56 5.08
FI 9.73 6.91 9.88
Sl 0.58 1.00 0.50
Sv 0.24 0.00 0.43
C1 25.12 15.00 21.92
CERT 31.45 0.00 42.52
PRIOR 0.24 0.00 0.43
PREFf 0.16 0.00 0.37
PREFd 0.66 1.00 0.48
RV B 2.95 3 1.53
RV C 4.95 5 1.83
DI 1.99 1.70 2.04
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sample of 5.34 percent.9 It should be kept in mind that in the class of banks some large
conglomerates, including insurance branches, are included. Up to a certain level share
ownership by banks has a strong positive effect on firm performance. For insurance
companies and pension funds (PINS) and the sum of all financial institutions (FI )
we find less significant results for the quadratic relationship.10 Apparently the ex
ante risk taking, the ex post monitoring and state verification stimulate profitability
for firms. It should be noted that our definition of profitability includes financial
expenses. It might be so that if a financial institution has a large ownership, it reduces
the interest burden, which reduces profitability by definition in our case. It is more
likely though that a large financial owner is able to put pressure on its own interests
over the other minority shareholders. We test for this effect separately in our second
class of models. Summarizing, we find support for the insider hypothesis, as put
forward by Gorton and Schmid (1996). There is a difference with the latter study
though, since we find evidence for a hump-shaped relationship instead of a U-curve.
The shape of our relationship is more in line with the one found by Morck et al.
(1988) for inside ownership. This supports the idea that Dutch financial institutions
might act as insiders. We return to this issue below. A final remark should be made
with respect to the conditioning variables. Here we only find evidence for a strong
negative impact of leverage on firm performance.
Given the result that share ownership by financial institutions matters for firm
performance and also given that shareholders are not able to exercise control in
the case of the Netherlands, we now address the question as to which channels of
influence might be used by financial institutions in order to guard their interests as
shareholders. As argued in Section 2.3 we investigate two channels of influence:
creditorship and networking. We first discuss creditorship as an alternative means
to discipline managers. A creditor might be powerful when a firm defaults or vi-
olates debt contracts. If debt is mainly short-term, firms have to come back on a
regular basis. Moreover a bank is a natural institution to monitor firm activities. In
case of bankruptcy a bank is often responsible for the change of management. The
effectiveness of creditors depends on the legal rights they have. We use the share of
short-term bank debt of total assets, the share of long-term debt of total assets and
financial expense as percentage of total assets as financial ratios. By doing so, we
9If one has a close look at the distribution of BANK one can observe mass in the 0 to 5 per cent
interval and some observations around 20 percent ownership. Finding the quadratic relationship might
therefore be based on the location of outliers. There are two serious outliers for BANK (observations
around 40 percent ownership with low profitability). If we exclude these two firms from the regressions
we still find a significant optimum of the quadratic of 12 percent ownership.
10We also tested the influence of networking on firm performance and find no relationship.
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Table 3 Profitability: the impact of ownership
Financial institution BANK PINS FI
Model (1) (2) (3)
Equity ownership
- linear 0.311 0.431 0.188
(0.129) (0.225) (0.122)
- quadratic -0.011 -0.022 -0.005
(0.004) (0.014) (0.004)
(only linear term) -0.031 0.116 0.012
(0.072) (0.082) (0.048)
Conditioning variables
ln.T A/ 0.357 0.461 0.457
(0.280) (0.301) (0.288)
LEVERAGE -3.596 -0.428 -2.245
(3.866) (4.021) (4.045)
DI -0.213 -0.192 -0.200
(0.254) (0.270) (0.261)
CF=T A 0.241 0.257 0.248
(0.066) (0.065) (0.068)
Governance variables
Sl -0.274 -0.341 -0.257
(0.891) (0.920) (0.925)
Sv 2.574 2.502 2.576
(1.248) (1.401) (1.317)
C1 0.025 0.015 0.020
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
CERT 0.024 0.026 0.026
(0.010) (0.021) (0.011)
PRIOR 2.297 2.621 2.452
(1.130) (1.162) (1.172)
PREFf -1.611 -1.948 -1.609
(1.068) (1.038) (1.064)
PREFp 1.005 1.022 0.942
(0.850) (0.916) (0.951)
NR2 0.427 0.385 0.379
F 4.427 3.884 3.807
Robust White estimation. Industry dummies not reported.
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look upon the financial structure as being endogenous. As conditioning variables we
use size, the share of material assets in total assets, gross investment, the coefficient
of variation of cash flow, cash flow over total assets and the diversity index. We also
include the instruments to limit voting power. The model estimated reads:
FCi D 0 C 1SHi C 6jiCji C 6γjidji C 6ij vij C i (2)
where FC denotes the financial indicator: bankdebt BDT OT , or long-term debt
LT DEBT , or financial expenses FE. SH denotes either BANK-share ownership
or PINS-share ownership, Cj is a conditioning variable and dj an industry dummy,
vj the variable indicating a limitation of voting power and  a white-noise error term.
From Table 4 it can be seen that bank ownership stimulates short-term bank lending.11
Our results are in line with the hypothesis that banks like to have control through
ownership and supply of funds. It should be noted, however, that our FC-variables
cannot be linked to individual financial institutions, since these data are not available.
Insofar there is a financing channel we can only observe this on the group-level. Bank
ownership has no relationship with long-term funding. The table shows that financial
ownership is not relevant for financial expenses, which supports our findings for the
profitability measure in Table 3. There is no significant relationship between PINS
and our financial variables, which can be thought of as an illustration of the fact
that insurance companies and pension funds are less important when it comes to the
supply of debt. For the voting power variables we observe that the issuing of finance
prefs leads to lower short-term bank credit and more long-term debt. The remaning
voting variables are all insignificant in explaning financial structure.
We finally turn to networking as a control device. If we find evidence of demand
for networking by financial institutions we can see this as an alternative means of
control, i.e. an example of inside control. As dependent variable we take the variable
NET AB, which means that we only look at informal networking if the financial in-
stitution (firm) representative on the supervisory board of a firm (financial institution)
sits on the management board herself. We estimate the impact of financial ownership
on the probability of a network relation. We expect that if we correct for other control
devices, such as interest and dividend outlays and the credit channel, networking
would be relevant for financial institutions, in the sense that share ownership SH
increases the probability of networking. The model reads:
prob.NET AB D 1/ D 0 C 1SHi C 6jiCij C 6jiACji C (3)
6γjidj i C i
11The firms Burgman Heybroek and Koppelpoort are excluded in the regressions due to outliers in
the bank-debt variable.
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Table 4 Financing channel: the impact of ownership
Institution BANK BANK BANK PINS PINS PINS
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Item BDT OT LT DEBT FE BDT OT LT DEBT FE
Equity ownership
- linear 2.496 0.055 -0.012 -2.213 -0.146 -0.055
(0.969) (0.095) (0.026) (1.552) (0.188) (0.048)
Conditioning variables
ln.T A/ -3.694 -0.104 -0.372 -5.791 -0.210 -0.414
(6.030) (0.596) (0.185) (6.409) (0.601) (0.185)
FIXED 83.984 35.822 -2.921 62.535 35.139 -2.941
(75.925) (5.599) (1.947) (78.648) (5.618) (1.987)
IKGROSS -0.339 -0.002 -0.005 -0.586 -0.004 -0.002
(0.430) (0.048) (0.022) (0.422) (0.049) (0.021)
cv.SAL/ 123.644 2.019 -0.573 100.421 0.627 -0.132
(59.798) (6.811) (2.248) (61.292) (7.312) (2.216)
CF=T A -2.277 -0.152 -0.032 -2.407 -0.161 -0.037
(1.730) (0.144) (0.046) (1.855) (0.139) (0.044)
DI -0.302 0.507 0.034 -2.288 0.457 0.044
(5.239) (0.521) (0.134) (5.219) (0.516) (0.133)
Governance variables
Sl -37.455 -0.171 -0.983 -35.606 -1.472 -0.895
(32.198) (2.373) (0.744) (33.623) (2.369) (0.733)
Sv -43.634 -0.090 -0.213 -33.351 0.341 0.263
(32.945) (3.286) (0.874) (34.724) (3.254) (0.847)
C1 -0.179 -0.012 -0.013 -0.338 -0.021 -0.015
(0.373) (0.037) (0.011) (0.372) (0.039) (0.011)
CERT -0.061 -0.042 -0.004 -0.092 -0.042 -0.003
(0.195) (0.023) (0.006) (0.197) (0.023) (0.006)
PRIOR -11.322 -0.890 -0.140 -21.028 -1.102 -0.101
(17.495) (2.155) (0.662) (16.218) (2.071) (0.651)
PREFf -41.655 5.140 0.353 -30.021 5.609 0.449
(20.610) (2.448) (0.673) (20.257) (2.509) (0.643)
PREFp -3.813 -1.565 -0.754 -5.872 -1.676 -0.813
(17.028) (1.837) (0.531) (16.722) (1.862) (0.526)
NR2 0.109 0.399 0.026 0.066 0.404 0.042
F 1.526 4.779 1.118 1.303 3.968 1.194
Robust White standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies not reported.
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where NET AB denotes the networking variable, SH denotes either FI -share own-
ership, BANK-share ownership or PINS-share ownership, Cj is a conditioning
variable, ACj an alternative control variable, dj an industry dummy and  a white-
noise error term. The alternative control or governance variables are the interest and
dividend to cash flow and short-term bank loans as a percentage of total assets.12 The
conditioning variables are size, the size of the supervisory board (which is a scale
indicator), the diversity index and cash flow uncertainty. Table 5 gives the results. It
shows that only share holdings by insurance companies and pension funds (PINS)
have a significant impact on the probability of a networking relation. For the group of
financial institutions as a whole (FI D BANK C PINS) share ownership does not
have a significant impact on the probability of networking through the supervisory
board. A similar conclusion is reached if one only looks at share ownership by banks
The above mentioned significant (positive) PINS-coefficient is interesting because
it complements our findings on the relationship between the financial structure of
firms and share ownership as measured by PINS in table 5. Non-bank financial
institutions are less important as creditors than banks and the only control device left
for these institutions might thus be networking.
5 Summary
In this paper we analyse the relationship between firm performance, financial own-
ership and networking in the Netherlands. The Dutch system of corporate gover-
nance differs from its Anglo-Saxon and German counterparts. First there are rather
widespread methods to limit voting power of shareholders. Secondly, the structural
regime puts a lot of weight on the role of the supervisory board.
Overall, we find evidence to substantiate the idea that share ownership by financial
institutions is important in Dutch corporate governance. In line with the terminology
used by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) we find a role for share ownership by financial
institutions, specially bank conglomerates, (since it affects firm performance) and
indirectly for large creditors and for inside control through networking (both are
affected to some extent by share ownership by financial institutions).
Although financial ownership is limited the special legal structures surrounding
Dutch public firms makes that financial institutions like to control managers in a
number of ways. This is in line with the recent discussion on corporate governance in
12We also included all the variables indicating a limitation of voting power. These all turned out to
be highly insignificant. In order to save degrees of freedom we skipped them in the final regressions.
23
Table 5 Networking channel
Institution FI BANK PINS
Equity ownership
- linear 0.048 0.036 0.164
(0.031) (0.046) (0.076)
Alternative governance
INT CF -0.094 -0.089 -0.096
(0.056) (0.058) (0.049)
DIV CF 0.039 0.037 0.045
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
BDT OT 3.703 3.852
(7.192) (7.148)
Conditioning variables
T A 0.281 0.258 0.392
(0.365) (0.348) (0.386)
log.RV C/ 3.063 2.827 3.348
(1.807) (1.743) (1.899)
DI 0.270 0.233 0.346
(0.231) (0.222) (0.239)
cv.CF/ 2.000 1.570 2.574
(1.705) (1.612) (1.850)
loglikelihood -19.246 -20.210 -17.920
Binary probit estimation. Industry dummies not reported.
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the Netherlands, where large institutional investors dominate the discussion to give
more voting power to the shareholders.
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